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Construction Law
by Brian J. Morrissey*
I.

INTRODUCTION

As the construction industry moved through its recession, a number
of issues eventually percolated their way through the appellate courts.
Not surprisingly, once projects began going under, many of these cases
focused on novel theories seeking to impose liability against "deep
pockets."
The most significant event during the survey period was the development of a unique approach to impose liability against the government for
the insolvency of sureties presented on public works projects, and the
abrupt reversal of the adoption of this theory by the Georgia Supreme
Court.
Also during the survey period, there were a number of attempts to
impose liability against lenders on construction projects for the failure
to ensure that payments were made to contractors in such a way as to
avoid the imposition of liens, and on commitments to keep construction
loans flowing.
I.

LENDER RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS

The entanglement of the banking industry in both commercial and
residential construction raised a number of issues concerning a lender's
responsibilities and rights vis-a-vis the participants in a construction
project. As a lender moves toward "pulling the plug" on a particular
project or development, the ramifications for an owner or a contractor
may be extremely serious and detrimental. Borrowers and third parties
affected by a lender's actions have all sought, through various means,
recourse against a lender who acts in a manner detrimental to the
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Member, State Bars of Georgia and Florida.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

furtherance of a project. Georgia courts have always been reluctant to
place a great deal of responsibility on lenders in connection with their
actions concerning loans. However, the degree of involvement by a
lender in a particular project or development may be the key factual
feature affecting a determination of a lender's responsibilities.
A.

Disbursement of Loan Proceeds

Trpically, a lender has no liability beyond its contractual responsibilities to the parties with whom it contracted.' This principle was
followed during the survey period. In Peterson v. First Clayton Bank &
Trust Co.,2 Stovall Building Supplies, a supplier of materials used in the
construction of a house, filed a complaint to foreclose a materialman's
lien against the owner and to collect on an open account against the
builder, Shope, in connection with the construction of a house for Robert
and Gertrude Peterson, the property owners.3 The Petersons filed a
third party claim against the construction lender, First Clayton Bank &
Trust, alleging that the bank breached its contractual and fiduciary
duties in disbursing loan proceeds for the construction of the house.4
The Petersons' main allegation against the bank was that it failed to
administer and account for disbursements properly, and it failed to
exercise appropriate care in assuring that the builder had been paying
subcontractors and suppliers.5
The construction contract between the Petersons and the builder
required the builder, upon request, to furnish the owner or a bank
representative with times of withdrawals. Furthermore, the builder
would have to provide a statement showing an itemization of expenditures to date, items due and unpaid, and supporting documentation
including receipts, as well as affidavits, waivers of liens, and other
evidence of payment. After reviewing the construction contract, the
bank agreed to finance construction of the house.' During a series of
conversations, it became clear that the bank, as part of its loan function,
would handle disbursements and payments to the builder required under
the construction contract.7 Also, the bank would regularly inspect the

1.
Rv.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

See Brian J. Morrissey & Matthew W. Wallace, Construction Law, 43 MERCER L.
141, 142 (1991).
214 Ga. App. 94, 447 S.E.2d 63 (1994).
Id. at 94, 447 S.E.2d at 64.
Id.
Id.
Id.
1d.
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property to monitor progress of the construction.8 The Petersons, who
were living in Florida at the time, could not monitor the progress of their
home's construction in Georgia.'
The Construction Loan Agreement between the Petersons and the
bank stated:
Borrower authorizes and directs Lender to pay any loan proceeds due
under the terms of this agreement to [the builder]. Lender has no

liability or obligation in connection with the project or the construction
and completion thereof, except to advance loan proceeds as agreed in
this document. Lender is not obligated to inspect any improvements,
nor is it liable for the performance or default of any contractor or
subcontractor or for any failure to construct, complete, protect, or
insure said improvements or for the payment of any costs or expenses

incurred in the project. Nothing, including without limitation any
disbursement or the delivery or acceptance of any document or
instrument, shall be construed as a representation or warranty on

Lender's part. Lender is not the agent or representative of the
Borrower, and the Borrower is not the agent or representative of the
Lender. This agreement does not reflect a partnership or joint venture
on the part of the parties and shall only serve to represent and
document the loan in terms of Borrower's construction loan ....
Lender reserves the right to require execution of any materialmen's

lien affidavits or release of materialmen's lien affidavits by any
contractor or subcontractor or Borrower at any time during the term
The parties agree that the Lender may
of this agreement ....
disburse the proceeds of the loan to pay any expenses or liens incurred
in connection with the construction and completion of the single-family
residence and payment or performance of any obligation of Borrower
to Lender, and at its election, Lender may pay said proceeds to
Borrower or to the contractor or to any other person furnishing labor,
supplies or services for construction of the residence or to the holder of
any lien, charge or encumbrance on the premises or other property
securing the loan, and the whole of such proceeds are hereby assigned,
This
transferred and pledged to Lender for such purposes ....
agreement shall constitute the sole agreement between the parties and
shall not be modified, changed or altered unless in writing executed by

both parties.10

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 95, 447 S.E.2d at 64-65.
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Simultaneously, the Petersons signed an agreement authorizing a bank
official to handle disbursements of draws payable directly to the
contractor on the construction loan."
The bank proceeded to disburse funds to the builder upon request,
sometimes with the participation of the Petersons, who at times
reviewed disbursement requests. The builder failed to pay suppliers and
subcontractors, however, and as a result, $38,000 in liens were filed
against the property, which were not satisfied by the Petersons. The
Petersons defaulted on the Construction Loan Agreement by failing to
remove the liens, and the bank foreclosed on the property.'
The bank moved for summary judgment on the Petersons' third party
3
claim for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty."
The trial court
granted the bank's motion, and the Petersons' appealed. 4 The Georgia
Court of Appeals found that the bank had not undertaken any responsibility to ensure that materialmen and subcontractors were paid before
disbursing loan proceeds to the builder." In doing so, the court of
appeals rejected the Petersons' argument that the agreement by the
bank officials to make such payments was a modification to the terms
of the Construction Loan Agreement.'
There was no modification
because the bank officials did not promise anything other than what the
Construction Loan Agreement provided for in the first place, that is, that
the bank could disburse payments directly to the builder and would
monitor construction progress. 7 No implied contractual provision
existed since an obligation to ensure that materialmen and subcontractors were paid was not necessary to effect the full purpose of the contract
between the Petersons and the bank; therefore, it could not fairly be said
to be within the contemplation of the parties.' 8 The Petersons expressly authorized the bank to pay loan proceeds directly to the builder, and
the Construction Loan Agreement provided that the bank was not liable

11.

Id. at 96, 447 S.E.2d at 65.

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 98, 447 S.E.2d at 66-67.
16.

Id. at 97-98, 447 S.E.2d at 66. O.C.G.A. § 13-4-4 (1982) provides:

Where parties, in the course of the execution of a contract, depart from its terms
and pay or receive money under such departure, before either can recover for
failure to pursue the letter of the agreement, reasonable notice must be given to
the other of intention to rely on the exact terms of the agreement. The contract
will be suspended by the departure until such notice.
Id. § 13-4-4.
17. 214 Ga. App. at 98, 447 S.E.2d at 66.
18. Id.
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or obligated in connection with the project in any respect except to
advance loan proceeds as agreed in the contract. 9 Thus, no implied
contract could exist simultaneously with this express understanding. 0
Regarding the Petersons' claim for negligence and breach of fiduciary
duty on the part of the bank, the court of appeals held that in addition
to any breach of contractual obligation, there must also be a breach of
a duty imposed by statute or recognized legal principle.21 Typically, a
lender has no obligation to protect the owner on a construction project
unless the lender's activities extend beyond that of the conventional
construction lender and the lender actually engages in activities
connected to the construction of the property.2 The court of appeals
found that the bank, while agreeing to assist the Petersons by making
payments directly to the builder, did not agree to obtain lien waivers,
payment affidavits, or otherwise ensure that suppliers were paid before
Moreover, the Petersons did not
disbursing funds to the builder.'
surrender to the bank their own contractual obligations to ensure that
all labor and material bills were paid and that the property be kept free
from liens." The court of appeals concluded that the bank's primary
role was to protect its interests in the secured property and not to ensure
that the borrowers' interests were protected.25 While the bank had an
obligation to exercise diligence and good faith in the disbursement of
construction funds in a timely manner for work actually performed,
nothing in this obligation compelled the bank to undertake duties owed
by the builder or the Petersons.2 6
B.

ContinuedAvailability of Credit
In Wachovia Bank of Georgia v. Mothershed,2 ' Wachovia Bank's
motion for summary judgment was granted on its claim for a deficiency
judgment on three promissory notes made as construction loans to
Mothershed.'
Mothershed counterclaimed for breach of an oral
contract under which Wachovia was to make future construction

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 99, 447 S.E.2d at 67.
22. Id. See Harden v. Akridge, 193 Ga. App. 736, 389 S.E.2d 6 (1989); First Fed. Say.
Bank of Brunswick v. Fretthold, 195 Ga. App. 482, 394 S.E.2d 128 (1990).
23. 214 Ga. App. at 99-100, 447 S.E.2d at 67.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 100, 447 S.E.2d at 68.
26. Id.
27. 210 Ga. App. 853, 437 S.E.2d 852 (1993).
28. Id. at 854, 437 S.E.2d at 854.
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loans.2' The failure of Wachovia to make these loans resulted in the
An
collapse of Mothershed's residential construction business.'
interlocutory appeal was taken from the denial of summary judgment to
both Wachovia's claim against Mothershed and Mothershed's counterclaim against Wachovia. s1
The court of appeals reversed the denial of summary judgment finding
that the promissory notes, as unconditional obligations, were sufficient
in and of themselves to support a cause of action. 2 Parol testimony
could not outline conditions not referenced specifically on the face of the
notes." Mothershed contended that the oral agreement to extend
future construction loans required the bank to maintain an inventory of
construction or "spec" loans at all times. So, when one home sold,
another loan would be offered based upon an appraisal of the proposed
home, a review of the plans, the rate of interest then charged on
construction loans, and the necessity of renewability of the loan.3 '
Since the parties did not agree upon any specific parcels to secure the
loans, no time limitations were specified, the value of the loans was
indefinite, and no maturity date was specified, the court of appeals
determined that there was not sufficient evidence of a contract, merely
an agreement to agree in the future.'

III.
A.

CONTRACT FORMATION, CONSTRUCTION, AND BREACH

ContractFormation

Dual Agency. In Remediation Services, Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific
Corp.,"6 a dredging contractor brought an action to recover payment
against Georgia-Pacific on theories of breach of contract and quantum
meruit. 37 An environmental engineer responsible for dredging projects
on behalf of Georgia-Pacific was a fifty percent owner in Remediation

29. Id. at 853, 437 S.E.2d at 853.
30. Id.
31. Id.

32. Id. at 854, 437 S.E.2d 853-54.
33. Id.

34. Id. at 854-55, 437 S.E.2d at 854.
35. Id. at 855, 437 S.E.2d at 854. Prior to July 1, 1988, commitments to lend money
were not required to be in writing. After that date, any commitment to lend money had
to be in writing. See O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30 (1988).
36. 209 Ga. App. 427, 433 S.E.2d 631 (1993).
37. Id. at 427, 433 S.E.2d at 632.
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Services and instrumental in awarding the dredging contract, the scope
of which was determined by this employee.'
By way of defense, Georgia-Pacific asserted that it was defrauded by
39
one of its own employees, making the dredging contract void ab initio.
The court of appeals found that dual agency did not render the contract
void per se, but voidable at the option of the principal who was without
knowledge of the dual agency at the time the contract was entered. 4°
Indefiniteness of Contract. In Jackson v. Williams,4' plaintiffs
Jackson and Crider filed suit against Williams for breach of a contract
to construct a road. 42 Jackson and Crider had leased a piece of
property, a portion of which was subleased to Williams for use as a
quarry.' The agreement was modified by locating the quarry on the
parcel, which leasehold interest was assigned through DMH Holdings,
Williams' company, to Vulcan Materials Company. 4 Jackson and
Crider contended Williams entered into an oral contract to construct a
road which would connect the quarry to a nearby public highway.
Williams performed some preliminary construction in 1989 and 1990,
but stopped work and repudiated the alleged agreement.45
At trial judgment was entered in favor of Jackson and Crider for
$715,000 in contractual damages and $40,000 for bad faith.' Williams'
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was granted from
which the plaintiffs appealed.4 7
The court of appeals held:
The requirement of certainty extends not only to the subject matter
and purpose of the contract, but also to the parties, consideration, and
even the time and place of performance where these are essential.
When a contract is substantially alleged, some details might be
supplied under the doctrines of reasonable time or reasonable
requirements. But indefiniteness in subject matter so extreme as not

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 427-28, 433 S.E.2d at 632-33.
Id. at 427, 433 S.E.2d at 632.
Id. at 430, 433 S.E.2d at 634.
209 Ga. App. 640, 434 S.E.2d 98 (1993).
Id. at 640, 434 S.E.2d at 98.
Id.
Id. at 641, 434 S.E.2d at 99.
Id.
Id. at 640, 434 S.E.2d at 98.
Id., 434 S.E.2d at 98-99.
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to present anything upon which the contract may operate in a definite
manner renders the contract void .... 48
The court of appeals found the oral contract to be indefinite and
unenforceable because there were no discussions between the parties
regarding the material content of the road, the precise location of the
road or its dimensions, or the estimated cost of the project.49 Moreover,
there were no discussions concerning the time period for construction or
a completion date."'
B.

Contract and Construction

Time Is of the Essence. In Separk v. Caswell Builders, Inc.,51 the
purchaser of a house constructed by Caswell Builders argued that a
"time of the essence" clause in the contract vitiated the contract itsolf
once closing did not occur on the date specified in the contract.5 2 The
court of appeals found plaintiff's contention to be without merit, absent
an expiration date specifically in the contract and a clause imposing a
condition of closing by the date specified. 3 The time of the essence
clause merely bound the parties to perform certain actions by the date
specified, the failure of which would be a breach."
Privity. In Crispens Enterprise, Inc. v. Halstead,5 Halstead
contracted with Crispens Enterprise to construct a garage.5 Crispens
Enterprise subcontracted the pouring of a fifteen foot high concrete
retaining wall to Con-Wall Construction Company.57 The concrete wall
cracked, and Crispens Enterprise was unable to repair it satisfactoriHalstead sued for breach of contract and other theories.5"
ly.'
Partial summary judgment was granted against Crispens Enterprise

48. Id. at 642,434 S.E.2d at 100 (quoting Peachtree Medical Bldg., Inc. v. Keel, 107 Ga.
App. 438, 441, 130 S.E.2d 530, 532 (1963)).
49. Id. at 643, 434 S.E.2d at 100.
50. Id.
51. 209 Ga. App. 713, 434 S.E.2d 502 (1993).
52. Id. at 713, 434 S.E.2d at 502-03.
53. Id. at 714, 434 S.E.2d at 503.
54. Id.
55. 209 Ga. App. 133, 433 S.E.2d 353 (1993).
56. Id. at 133, 433 S.E.2d at 354.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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with respect to its contractual liability for the negligent construction of
the retaining wall.' Crispens Enterprise appealed."'
The contract provided that Crispens Enterprise would erect a thirty
foot by forty foot garage, including a retaining wall. 2 The court of
appeals found that under the express contract drafted by Crispens
Enterprise, the scope of the builder's work included the construction of
the retaining wall, with Halstead's understanding and permission that
the actual construction of the wall would be subcontracted to Con-Wall
Construction.' This did not alter the relationship between Crispens
Enterprise and the owner, nor did it result in a direct contract between
the owner and Con-Wall Construction.6 Accordingly Crispens Enterprise, as the general contractor, was responsible for the proper erection
of the garage pursuant to the written agreement and could be held
accountable under a claim of breach of contract.'
Acceptance of Work.

In Emory Rent-All, Inc. v. Lisle Associates

General Contractors," the parties entered into a written construction
contract providing that Lisle Associates would build a new office building
for Emory Rent-All for $135,730. The contract contained a retainage
clause under which Emory Rent-All was to make bi-weeldy payments of
ninety percent of labor and materials incorporated into the job. The
retainage balance was to be paid upon acceptance of the completed
building, or occupancy, whichever occurred first."
The contract
included blueprints which provided for a concrete retaining wall
reinforced with steel.6 '
Prior to completion of the project and before acceptance, Emory RentAll noticed that the retaining wall was defective. 70 Lisle Associates
acknowledged the defect and attempted to make a correction, but even
after the repair was performed, Emory Rent-All objected to paying the
retainage on the project because of "paving problems and wall problems."71 Subsequently, Lisle Associates executed an extended five-year

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 133-34, 433 S.E.2d at 354.
Id. at 134, 433 S.E.2d at 354.
Id.
212 Ga. App. 516, 441 S.E.2d 926 (1994).
Id. at 516, 441 S.E.2d at 927.
Id.

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id at 516-17, 441 S.E.2d at 927.
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warranty on the wall and issued a check representing that portion of
retainage pertaining to the retaining wall. 2 In lieu of being satisfied
by the condition of the wall, Emory Rent-All accepted the extension on
the warranty in exchange for payment of the retainage. 73
During the initial one-year warranty period, Emory Rent-All notified
Lisle Associates that the retaining wall had a continuing defect, which
Emory Rent-All had the wall
Lisle Associates refused to repair.'
repaired and then sued Lisle Associates under the extended warranty for
the repair cost.75
The trial court directed a verdict for Lisle Associates on the theory
that the extended warranty had no consideration and was therefore a
nudum pactum and void. 6 Emory Rent-All appealed this decision."
The court of appeals held that "by accepting the building in less than
'contract status,' Emory provided consideration for the 'new' extended
warranty in return for paying the contested retainage."'
C.

Breach and Remedies

Limitation of Actions. In Heffernan v. Johnson,"9 suit was
brought for negligence and fraud arising out of Johnson's installation of
tile for Heffernan.' The trial court granted summary judgment to the
defendant on the statute of limitations defense.81 The four-year statute
of limitations pertaining to trespass or damage to realty has been
construed to measure the accrual of that right of action at the time of
substantial completion of the project.8 2 The court of appeals further

72. Id. at 517, 441 S.E.2d at 927.
73. Id
74. Id.

75. Id.
76. Id. at 516, 441 S.E.2d at 927.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 517, 441 S.E.2d at 928. But see Owings v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co.,
188 Ga. App. 265, 372 S.E.2d 825 (1988) (agreement to discount attorney fees to be
recovered under the judgment was unenforceable because of lack of consideration).
79. 209 Ga. App. 139, 433 S.E.2d 108 (1993).
80. Id. at 139-40, 433 S.E.2d at 108.
81. Id. at 140, 433 S.E.2d at 108. The applicable statute of limitations may be found
in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-30: "All actions for trespass upon or damage to realty shall be brought
within four years after the right of action accrues." Id. § 9-3-30. For a discussion of the
applicable statute of repose which may also affect the right to bring an action, see Brian
J. Morrissey & Matthew W. Wallace, ConstructionLaw, 43 MERCER L. REV. 141, 147-48
(1991).
82. 209 Ga. App. at 140, 433 S.E.2d at 109. See Corporation of Mercer Univ. v.
National Gypsum Co., 258 Ga. 365, 368 S.E.2d 732 (1988).
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held that the discovery rule and continuing tort theories are not
applicable to actions involving only property damage.83
Recoupment. In Exterior Wall Systems, Inc. v. Dean," Exterior
Wall Systems sued to recover sums due for labor and materials
furnished in the construction of Dean's residence.' Defendant counterclaimed for negligent damage to the residence and breach of contract.'
The plaintiff appealed the jury's verdict for the defendant on plaintiff's
claims and in favor of plaintiff on defendant's counterclaims.8 7 The
court of appeals reversed the judgment against Exterior Wall Systems
based upon the trial judge's erroneous instruction to the jury that
defendant's nonpayment was justified if the plaintiff extracted and
collected more than was actually due.'M The court of appeals held that
nonpayment was not the remedy for such a breach of contract, but
M
recoupment was appropriate."
Election of Remedies. In LeBrook, Inc. v. Jefferson,"° the purchasers of a new home sued the construction contractor for negligence,
breach of warranty, and fraud.9 ' Plaintiff Jefferson initially executed
a contract with LeBrook for the purchase of a newly constructed home.
The home, however, was not built according to specifications approved
by the Veterans Administration; consequently, a builder's warranty and
a commercial warranty were required by the lender. 2 The parties
amended the contract to include a representation that the contractor
would provide the requisite warranties. 3 The contractor failed to
forward an application or premium to the commercial warrantor, and the
property was not enrolled under the warranty program.9 After closing,
Jefferson discovered water under the home and notified the contractor,
who made one attempt to make a repair that failed.95

83.

209 Ga. App. at 140, 433 S.E.2d at 109.

84. 210 Ga. App. 428, 436 S.E.2d 543 (1993).
85. Id. at 428, 436 S.E.2d at 543-44.
86. Id.
87. Id., 436 S.E.2d at 544.
88. Id.
89. Id. Recoupment is a claim or demand of the defendant arising out of the same
transaction as that sued on by the plaintiff. See O.C.GA. § 13-7-3 (1982).
90. 210 Ga. App. 650, 437 S.E.2d 360 (1993).
91. Id. at 650, 437 S.E.2d at 361.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 651, 437 S.E.2d at 361.
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At trial the contractor unsuccessfully moved for a directed verdict, and
the jury returned a verdict for Jefferson on all counts." Jefferson
elected to have a judgment entered only on the breach of warranty
claim.97 The court of appeals found that the jury's verdict would have
supported any theory of recovery asserted by the defendants.9 8
Difference Between Contract Price and Market Value. In
Separk v. Caswell Builders, Inc.," the court of appeals reiterated a
long-standing rule that the proper measure of damages on the breach of
contract to purchase real property is the difference between the contract
price and market price of the property on the day of breach."°
Voidability at Option of Principal. In Remediation Services, Inc.
v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.," the court of appeals reaffirmed that contracts created by dual agency are not void per se, but are voidable at the
option of the principal as the undisclosed dual agency operates as a
fraud upon the principal."0 2
Lost Profits. In Excavation +, Inc. .v. Candler,'3 Excavation +,
Inc. ("Excavation") contracted with Asa Candler V, Asa Candler VI, and
Candler/Lombard Limited Partnership to supply fill dirt for a proposed
shopping center.'
Excavation sued the defendants for lost profits
resulting from the repudiation of their construction contract.'
The
trial court granted summary judgment for defendants finding the
damages sought were speculative and conjectural." °
The court of appeals held that the measure of damages for the breach
was the contract price less what it would cost the contractor to perform.
In other words, the measure of damages was the lost profits.' 7 The
evidence adduced during discovery showed that Excavation did not know
what the expected profit was on the job and, as a result, any figure

96. Id. at 650, 437 S.E.2d at 361.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 651-52, 437 S.E.2d at 362.
99. 209 Ga. App. 713, 434 S.E.2d 502 (1993). For a more extensive discussion of this
case, see supra Part III, note 51.
100. 209 Ga. App. at 714, 434 S.E.2d at 503.
101. 209 Ga. App. 427, 433 S.E.2d 631 (1993). For more extensive treatment of this
case, see supra Part III, note 36.
102. 209 Ga. App. at 430, 433 S.E.2d at 634.
103. 209 Ga. App. 351, 433 S.E.2d 340 (1993).
104. Id. at 351, 433 S.E.2d at 340.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 352, 433 S.E.2d at 341.
107. Id.
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provided by its officers would be speculative in nature."l8 Excavation
also conceded that unexpected costs could arise in the construction
business that were outside its control."° As a result, many expenses
used in the estimate were based upon a timely completion of the
project.110 Excavation attempted to base its claim for damages on the
price contained in the defendant's contract and the price under which
Ivie & Associates, its subcontractor, had agreed to perform.'
As
Excavations claim was based purely on speculation as to amount, the
damages were remote and speculative,
and summary judgment was
11 2
properly entered against Excavation.
IV

A-

TORT LIABILTY-CONTRACTUAL DUTIES AND FRAUD

Negligence, Fraud,and Other Torts-Duties
Independent Contractors
Premises Liability.

In Englehart v. OKI America, Inc.,113 an

employee of a subcontractor brought an action against both a general
contractor and property owner for personal injuries sustained when he
fell through an opening in a floor which had been covered temporarily
with plywood." 4 The trial court granted summary
judgment to the
5
property owner, and the employee appealed."
A.R. Weeks & Associates was the general contractor on the project.
During construction there were openings in the floor for the installation
of the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning ("HVAC") system. As a
protective measure, these openings were covered with plywood." 6 The
property owner, OKI America, assigned one of its employees to visit the
construction site periodically to ensure that the general contractor was
17
conforming to the construction contract drawings and specifications.
Part of the duties of OKI America's inspector was to measure the size
and location of the HVAC openings. To do so, he removed plywood

108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 353, 433 S.E.2d at 341.
Id. at 352-53, 433 S.E.2d at 341.
Id. at 353, 433 S.E.2d at 341.
Id. Ivie & Associates disputed any written contractual agreement for the

performance of work or any agreement on price. Id.

112. Id.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

209 Ga. App. 151, 433 S.E.2d 331 (1993).
Id. at 151, 433 S.E.2d at 332.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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pieces,
took measurements, and replaced the plywood as he had found
18
1

it.

Generally, a property owner who has surrendered full possession and
control of the property to an independent contractor is not liable for any
injuries sustained on the property."" The plaintiff claimed that
exceptions to this general rule controlled the actions of OKI America
because they retained the right to direct or control the manner of
executing the work, OKI America ratified the negligence of the general
contractor when its employee placed the plywood pieces back over the
HVAC openings, or OKI America had a nondelegable duty imposed by
law.'
The trial court held that OKI America did not retain the right
to direct and control the manner of executing the work because the
construction contract provided complete control of the construction site
to the general contractor."
Moreover, the general contractor was
responsible for all safety precautions at the site.122 While OKI America did retain the right to ensure that the work conformed to the contract
drawing specifications, such right did not permit OKI America to
exercise control over the manner in which A.R. Weeks did the work.12
The court of appeals stated, "Such a general right does not mean that

118. Id.
119. Id., 433 S.E.2d at 333. See McClure v. Equitable Real Estate Inv. Management,
Inc., 195 Ga. App. 54, 392 S.E.2d 272 (1990); Towles v. Cox, 181 Ga. App. 194, 351 S.E.2d
718 (1986). O.C.GA. § 51-2-5 (1982) provides six exceptions to this rule:
An employer is liable for the negligence of a contractor:
(1) When the work is wrongful in itself or, if done in the ordinary manner, would
result in a nuisance;
(2) If, according to the employer's previous knowledge and experience, the work
to be done is in its nature dangerous to others however carefully performed;
(3) If the wrongful act is the violation of a duty imposed by express contract upon
the employer;
(4) If the wrongful act is the violation of a duty imposed by statute;
(5) If the employer retains the right to direct or control the time and manner of
executing the work or interfere and assumes control so as to create the relation
of master and servant or so that an injury results which is traceable to his
interference; or
(6) If the employer ratifies the unauthorized wrong of the independent contractor.
Id. § 51-2-5.
120. 209 Ga. App. at 151-53, 433 S.E.2d at 333-34. The nondelegable duty argued by
plaintiff as set forth in O.C.G.A. § 34-2-10(b) (1992) is as follows: "Every employer and
every owner of a place of employment, place of public assembly, or public building, now or
hereafter constructed, shall so construct, repair, and maintain such facility as to render it
reasonably safe." Id. § 34-2-10(b).
121. 209 Ga. App. at 152, 433 S.E.2d at 333.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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the contractor is controlled as to his methods of work. There must be
such a retention of a right of supervision that the contractor is not
entirely free to do the work in his own way." "
The court of appeals further found that OKI America did not ratify
any alleged negligence of the general contractor.1" The testimony of
OKI America's employee showed that he did not have Occupational
Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") construction site training,
was not responsible for checking on the safety of the work site maintained by the general contractor, and was merely there to ensure
1 that
the work conformed to the contract drawings and specifications. 2
Finally, the court of appeals found that OKI America did not have a
nondelegable duty to maintain the workplace. 127 A property owner can
delegate the responsibility of maintaining a safe workplace by relinquishing possession and control of the property to an independent
contractor.
Contractual Responsibility of General Contractor Not Relieved by
Negligence of Independent Contractor. While a property owner may
insulate itself from the negligence of an independent contractor, the
general contractor retaining a subcontractor is not absolved from
contractual responsibilities as a result of the negligence of the independent subcontractor. In Crispens Enterprise, Inc. v. Halstead,129 the
general contractor correctly asserted that because negligence was
committed by a subcontractor functioning as an independent contractor,
it could not be vicariously responsible for those acts.lm However, this
negligence did not relieve the general contractor of responsibility to the
owner for the failure of the construction to meet the plans and specifications.13

124. Id.

125. Id. at 152-53, 433 S.E.2d at 333-34.
126. Id., 433 S.E.2d at 334.
127. Id. at 153, 433 S.E.2d at 334.
128. Id.
129. 209 Ga. App. 133, 433 S.E.2d 353 (1993). For further treatment of this case, see
supra Part I1, note 55.
130. 209 Ga. App. at 134, 433 S.E.2d at 354-55.
131. Id., 433 S.E.2d at 355. O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5 (1982) provides: "An employer is liable
for the negligence of a contractor: ... (3) If the wrongful act is the violation of a duty
imposed by express contract upon the employer .... " Id. § 51-2-5(3).
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Negligence
Nuisance. In City of Lawrenceville v. Macko,3 2 William and
Patricia Macko sued for damages and injunctive relief on the theories of
negligence and nuisance against the City of Lawrenceville and Gaines
Brown, a residential home builder and seller of the Mackos' home, for
the periodic flooding of their home.'
The trial court entered judgment against the defendants, and they appealed.""
Brown applied for a building permit from the city to begin construction
on the Mackos' home in March 1987. Brown obtained a site plan and
topographical survey on the lot as required under the subdivision
plat.' The subdivision plat provided that the city disclaimed responsibility for overflow or erosion of natural or artificial rains beyond the
right-of-way." While the city began an inspection of the construction
site, it did not evaluate the drainage systems of the home or the
elevation of the home on the property.'37 In July 1989, the Mackos,
who had purchased the home, experienced major flooding in the driveunder garage, which resulted in damage to the home and personal
property.138
Under the Mackos' negligence theory, the city demanded judgment in
its favor. 3 9 The city argued liability could not attach to a duty owed
by the government that ran to the public generally and not to any
particular member of the public unless there existed a special relationship between the government and the individual that would give rise t
a particular duty owed to that individual. 4 ' This "public duty"
doctrine previously had not been applied to municipalities in actions
involving negligent inspection of homes or negligent issuance of building
permits.'" The court of appeals found that the city did not make

132. 211 Ga. App. 312, 439 S.E.2d 95 (1993).
133. Id. at 312, 439 S.E.2d at 97.

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 312-13, 439 S.E.2d at 97. Section 101.2.3 of the Lawrenceville City Building
Code provided that "[the inspection or permitting of any building or plan by any
jurisdiction, under the requirements of this Code shall not be construed in any court as a
warranty of the physical condition of such building or the adequacy of such plan." 211 Ga.
App. at 313, 439 S.E.2d at 97 (quoting Lawrenceville, Ga., City Building Code § 101.2.3).
138. 211 Ga. App. at 313, 439 S.E.2d at 98.
139. Id. at 315, 439 S.E.2d at 99.
140. Id.
141. Id. The court, however, went on to examine other jurisdictions in which the
doctrine had been applied in that context. Id. See Rich v. City of Mobile, 410 So.2d 385
(Ala. 1982); Trianon Park Condo. Ass'n v. City of Iialeah, 468 So.2d 912 (Fla. 1985);
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specific assurances or promises to the Mackos prior to the inspection and
approval of the home.142 Since the Mackos failed to establish the city
owed them a duty of care specifically based upon a special relationship,
the court of appeals determined that the trial court erred by failing to
grant a directed verdict to the city.'
To hold a municipality liable for nuisance, there must be a continuous
and regularly repetitious act or condition which causes injury, and the
municipality must have knowledge or be charged with notice of the
dangerous condition or repetitive acts causing injury.1" A municipality's liability cannot arise solely from its approval of construction
projects which increase surface water runoff.'45 Furthermore, mere
negligence, no matter how egregious the results, will not give rise to
liability against the municipality for nuisance.'48
There was no
evidence that the maintenance of the drainage system by the city caused
the flooding of the home. 47 Moreover, the evidence, viewed most
favorably to the Mackos, showed mere negligence on the part of the city,
which was insufficient to support a cause for nuisance. 48
Piercing Corporate Entity. Brown v. Rentz'" offers a method
wherein the corporate entity can be circumvented from having a serious
effect on individuals in closely-held construction companies." ° In
Brown home buyers brought suit against Rentz Builders, Inc., Lonnie S.
Rentz, and Linda Rentz for the negligent construction of the residence
and negligent misrepresentation in the sale of the residence.' 5 ' Lonnie
Rentz was a shareholder, director, and officer in Rentz Builders, Inc.
Linda Rentz was not a shareholder, but was the corporate secretary.
She was also a real estate agent for Royer
Realty, and her listings
15 2
included homes built by Rentz Builders.
Subsequent to purchase, the Browns discovered roof leaks and
basement flooding. Although Rentz Builders attempted to make repairs,
Ribeiro v. Town of Granby, 481 N.E.2d 466 (Mass. 1985); Dinsky v. Town of Framingham,
438 N.E.2d 51 (Mass. 1982); Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn.
1979); Delman v. City of Cleveland Heights, 534 N.E.2d 835 (Ohio 1989).
142. 211 Ga. App. at 315-16, 439 S.E.2d at 99.
143.
144,
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 316, 439 S.E.2d at 99.
Id., 439 S.E.2d at 100.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
212 Ga. App. 275, 441 S.E.2d 876 (1994).
Id. at 275, 441 S.E.2d at 877.
Id.
Id.
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the repairs were not satisfactory to the Browns.' The Browns alleged
that the problems were caused by defective construction and that the
Rentzes knowingly and falsely represented to them that the house was
properly constructed and of good quality.1 4 In the meantime; Rentz
Builders had no assets, and Lonnie Rentz was building homes under a
different corporate name.'
The trial court-granted the individual defendants' motion for summary
judgment."'6 The Browns appealed on the grounds that the Rentzes
had disregarded the corporate form and their respective activities with
they asserted
regard to the construction and sale of the house; therefore,
157
pierced.
been
have
should
veil
corporate
the
that
Despite the fact that the court did not specifically pierce the corporate
entity, and even though Lonnie Rentz did not build the house in his
individual capacity, the court of appeals overruled the trial court's grant
Clearly, an officer of
of summary judgment against Lonnie Rentz.'
a corporation who takes part in the commission of a tort by the
corporation is personally liable for that tort." 9 Furthermore, an officer
of a corporation who takes no part in the commission of a tort committed
by the corporation is not personally liable, unless he specifically directed
the particular act to be done or participated or cooperated in its
commission.' ° The evidence of record showed that the vast majority
of work was performed by subcontractors. Lonnie Rentz oversaw the
subcontract work, and according to the court, did "small stuff-"trim
work," "a little of the paint work," responded personally when the
Browns called, and personally performed some repair work that was
claimed to be defective.1 61 Based on this evidence, the court concluded
that a jury could find the corporation negligent in constructing the house
and could find that Lonnie Rentz was personally liable for that negligent
construction. 2 He could be liable personally because he specifically
directed the manner in which the house was constructed or he participated or cooperated in its negligent construction."6 3

153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

157. Id. at 275-76, 441 S.E.2d at 877.

158. Id. at 276, 441 S.E.2d at 878.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 276-77, 441 S.E.2d at 878. See Cherry v. Ward, 204 Ga. App. 833, 420
S.E.2d 763 (1992).
161. 212 Ga. App. at 277, 441 S.E.2d at 878.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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The ramifications of such a holding can best be understood in the
context of a small construction company which normally subcontracts out
all or most of the work. Typically, the owner of the construction
company is an officer and will act as the project superintendent. Under
the holding in Brown, the active involvement of the owner of the
business in the supervision of work subcontracted to independent
contractors will afford an easy vehicle for circumvention of the corporate
entity in virtually every construction project.
B. ProfessionalMalpractice
Third Party Practice. In Hussey, Gay, Bell & DeYoung International, Inc. v. Clay-Ric, Inc., '" Clay-Ric brought a third party claim
against Hussey, Gay, Bell & DeYoung International, Inc. ("Hussey Gay")
for professional negligence as a result of a claim brought by the plaintiff,
Charles Yow, against Clay-Ric for personal injuries resulting from
certain modifications to a storm drain on the work site." Clay-Ric
contended that Hussey Gay failed to exercise the requisite standard of
care for engineers by not replacing a cover on the storm drain where
Yow was injured after modifications were made, or by not issuing a
change order requiring the construction and installation of a new
cover.'" Hussey Gay brought an interlocutory appeal on the denial of
its motion for summary judgment.' 7
Yow had previously stipulated that he would not assert a professional
negligence claim against Hussey Gay.'" Because of this stipulation,
the court of appeals concluded that Hussey Gay, not being liable to Yow,
could not be a joint tortfeasor with Clay-Ric from which contribution
could be sought in a third-party claim.'69

164. 212 Ga. App. 53, 441 S.E.2d 274 (1994).
165. Id. at 53, 441 S.E.2d at 275. For more extensive treatment of the factual
background of this case, see Yow v. Hussey, Gay, Bell & DeYoung, Intl, Inc., 201 Ga. App.
857, 412 S.E.2d 565 (1991).
166. 212 Ga. App. at 53, 441 S.E.2d at 275.
167. Id.
168. I&
169. Id. The court in dictum indicated Clay-Ric may have an independent professional
malpractice claim against Hussey Gay unrelated to Yow's injuries, but Clay-Ric's real
damages are excluded by this decision because in reality they flow from Yow's injuries. Id.
at 53-54, 441 S.E.2d at 275.
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C. Remedies
Economic Loss Rule. In Advanced Drainage Systems, Inc. v.
Lowman,7 0 Advanced Drainage Systems, Inc. brought suit on an
account against Lloyd Lowman, d/bfa Lowman Septic.171 Lowman
counterclaimed. 172 The trial court granted a directed verdict for
plaintiff on its claim against Lowman, and the jury returned a verdict
for Lowman on the counterclaim against Advanced Drainage in the
amount of $130,000.173 Advanced Drainage appealed.174
Advanced Drainage manufactured graveless leach bed tubing designed
to be used as part of a waste water treatment system to move effluents
from septic tanks into the soil.175 Prior to this system, gravel systems
were used exclusively in Pierce County, where Lowman engaged in
business.176 When Lowman began installing the Advanced Drainage
system, a significant number of those systems failed.177 Lowman
contended that the Advanced Drainage system was not suitable for use
in a Georgia coastal plain area, contrary to representations he had
received.178 Lowman contended that repairs to the systems were to be
paid for by Advanced Drainage but, after several were repaired,
Advanced Drainage did not reimburse Lowman. 179
On Lowman's claim for damaged reputation, the court of appeals
stated that generally damages for such an injury are not recoverable in
an action premised on mere negligence where the plaintiff suffered no
physical injury, ,unless the plaintiff proves the defendant acted willfully
or wantonly."s The court of appeals found that the record did not
support a finding of wanton and willful conduct by Advanced Drainage
and thus the claim for damage to reputation should not have been
presented to the jury."' Lowman contended, however, that the
"economic loss" rule should not act to bar the remaining tort claims
brought by him against Advanced Drainage because he suffered personal

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

210 Ga. App. 731, 437 S.E.2d 604 (1993).
Id. at 731, 437 S.E.2d at 605.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 732, 437 S.E.2d at 605.
Id.
Id.
Id., 437 S.E.2d at 605-06.
Id., 437 S.E.2d at 606.
Id.
Id. at 733, 437 S.E.2d at 606.
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injury in the form of reputation damage.18 2 Because the court of
appeals decided that the reputation claim should not have been
presented to the jury, the economic loss rule controlled the case as there
was an absence of personal injury"'s The economic loss rule provides
that absent personal injury or damage to property other than to the
allegedly defective product itself, an action in negligence does not lie,
and a claim may be brought only as a contract warranty action.'
Two exceptions exist to this rule: (1) the "accident" exception, which
requires a sudden and calamitous event, which not only causes damage
to the product, but also poses an unreasonable risk of injury to persons
or other property; and (2) the "misrepresentation" exception, which
imposes a duty of reasonable care on parties to provide accurate
information to others whom they know will rely upon the information in
circumstances where the party providing the information is aware of
Neither of these exceptions were
how the information will be used.'
controlling in this case, and Lowman's claims were barred by the
economic loss rule.'
V

MATERIALMEN'S LIENS

A. Requirement of ContractualRelationship
In Benning Construction Co. v. Dykes Paving & Construction Co.,187
the Georgia Supreme Court considered the requirement of a contractual
relationship establishing a right to perfect a lien on property.'"
Benning Construction was a general contractor which had entered into
an agreement with Shaheen & Co. to construct an office and warehouse
facility."9 Benning subcontracted with Scarboro Paving to perform the
paving, curb, and gutter work associated with the project. 19' The
subcontract specifically prohibited assignment without the general
contractor's written consent. 91 Despite that prohibition and unbe-

182. Id.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id., 437 S.E.2d at 606-07.
Id., 437 S.E.2d at 607.
Id. at 734, 437 S.E.2d at 607.
Id at 733-34, 437 S.E.2d at 607.
263 Ga. 16, 426 S.E.2d 564 (1993).
Id. at 17-18, 426 S.E.2d at 566.
Id. at 16-17, 426 S.E.2d at 565.
Id. at 17, 426 S.E.2d at 565.

191. Id.
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knownst to the general contractor, Scarboro
entered into a contract with
19 2
Lanier Paving Co. to install the asphalt.
Lanier had obtained the materials necessary to perform the paving
from Dykes Paving & Construction Co.19 The owner, Shaheen & Co.,
rejected the parking lot alleging that it failed to meet contractual
specifications and demanded that it be replaced or resurfaced."'
Scarboro refused to comply, and Benning Construction paid another
subcontractor to resurface the parking lot.195 Moreover, Dykes Paving
demanded payment from the general contractor for materials Lanier had
used to pave the original parking lot after Lanier failed to pay them.
When Benning Construction refused to pay, Dykes notified Shaheen &
Co., as owners, of its intent to obtain a lien on the project and filed a
materialmen's lien for the cost of materials supplied to Lanier.'" The
lien was bonded by the general contractor.'9 7
Subsequently, Lanier declared bankruptcy and a default judgment was
entered against Scarboro in favor of Benning Construction.'
Dykes
then brought this action to foreclose its lien.'" A jury found in favor
of Dykes and returned a verdict against Benning and St. Paul, the
surety on the bond, in the amount of the cost of materials supplied to
Lanier. The court of appeals affirmed this verdict.2 '
The supreme court reversed on the ground that Dykes was not a
subcontractor within the meaning of the materialmen's lien statute. °"
A lien will attach to real estate for labor, services, or materials furnished
"if they are furnished at instance of the owner, contractor, or some

192. Id. Evidence of record indichted that the general contractor's superintendent
observed Lanier participating in the paving work. The superintendent never informed the
project manager or the general contractor's president of this fact, however, and they were
unaware of Lanier's participation until the asphalt had been completely installed.
Moreover, the project superintendent was not a party to the contract and did not have the
authority to approve an assignment of Scarboro's subcontract to Lanier. Only the project
manager and the president of the general contractor had the authority to waive the antiassignment clause. Scarboro never asked either for a waiver. Id.
193. Id. at 17, 426 S.E.2d at 565.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id., 426 S.E.2d at 565-66.
199. Id., 426 S.E.2d at 566.
200. Id. See Benning Constr. Co. v. Dykes Paving & Constr. Co., 204 Ga. App. 73, 418
S.E.2d 620 (1992).
201. 263 Ga. at 18-19, 426 S.E.2d at 566. "'Subcontractor means, but is not limited
to, subcontractors having privity of contract with the contractor." O.C.G.A. § 44-14-360(9)
(Supp. 1994).
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person acting for the owner or contractor."2t 2 The supreme court
concluded that the term "subcontractor" would be construed to mean
"one who, pursuant to a contract with the prime contractor or in a direct
chain of contracts leading to the prime contractor, performed the services
or procured another to perform services in furtherance of the goals of the
Because the contract between Scarboro and
prime contractor."m
Lanier was not authorized by the general contractor and was in fact in
violation of the anti-assignment clause contained in the contract between
the general contractor and Scarboro, the assigned contract between
Scarboro and Lanier was not in the direct chain of contracts leading to
Therefore, the materials provided by Dykes
the prime contractor.'
to Lanier were not furnished at the instance of the owner, contractor, or
some person acting for the owner or contractor as required by the
statute. 5 Consequently, absent proof of a contractual relationship,
either directly or through a chain of contracts between the owner of the
property and the person to whom the materials are furnished, a lien
created under the materialmen's lien statute will not attach. 2 6
Filing of FraudulentLiens
In Hicks v. McLain's Building Materials,Inc.,2'7 purchasers of a new
home brought an action for the filing of fraudulent materialmen's liens
and fraudulent misrepresentation against McLain's Building Materials,
a supplier for the project.2" After a lien had been filed, the amount
was paid by the purchasers, but the lien was not canceled." 9 The trial
court granted McLain's Building Materials' motion for summary
judgment, and the purchasers appealed.210
The court of appeals found there to be no tort in Georgia for the filing
of fraudulent liens.2 Georgia does recognize an action for defamation
concerning title to land which requires proof of special damages as a
result of the alleged defamation. 12 General allegations that defamaB.

202. 263 Ga. at 18, 426 S.E.2d at 566 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361(b) (Supp. 1994)).
203. Id. (quoting Tonn & Blank, Inc. v. D.M. Asphalt, Inc., 187 Ga.App. 272, 272-73,
370 S.E.2d 30, 31 (1988)).
204. Id.

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id
Id. at 18-19, 426 S.E.2d at 566.
209 Ga. App. 191, 433 S.E.2d 114 (1993).
Id. at 191, 433 S.E.2d at 115.
Id. at 191-92, 433 S.E.2d at 115.
Id. at 192, 433 S.E.2d at 115.

211. Id.
212. Id., 433 S.E.2d at 115-16.
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tion hindered obtaining213credit were not sufficient to establish the
requisite special damage.
The purchasers also asserted a direct claim under the materialmen's
lien statute.214 As the supplier had filed a claim of lien rather than a
preliminary notice, there was no statutory right to damages or attorney
fees as the statute provided merely for unenforceability of the lien.215

213. Id., 433 S.E.2d at 116.
214. Id. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.3 (Supp. 1994) provides as follows:
(a) Prior to filing a claim of lien, a person having a lien under paragraphs (1)
through (8) ofsubsection (a) of Code Section 44-14-361 may at such person's option
file a preliminary notice of lien rights. The preliminary notice of lien rights in
order to be effective shall:
(1) Be filed with the clerk of superior court of the county in which the real estate
is located within 30 days after the date a party delivered any materials or
provided any labor or services for which a lien may be claimed;
(2) State the name, address, and telephone number of the potential lien claimant;
(3) State the name and address of the contractor or other person at whose
insistance the labor, services, or materials were furnished;
(4) State the name of the owner of the real estate and include a description
sufficient to identify the real estate against which the lien is or may be claimed;
and
(5) Include a general description of the labor, services, or materials furnished or
to be furnished.
(b) A party filing a preliminary notice of lien rights except a contractor shall,
within seven days of filing the notice, send by registered or certified mail a copy
of the notice to the contractor on the property named in the notice or to the owner
of the property. The lien claimant may rely on the building permit issued on the
property for the name of the contractor.
(c) The clerk of each superior court shall maintain within the records of that office
a record separate from all other real estate records in which preliminary notices
specified in subsection (a) of this Code section and affidavits specified in
subsection (c) of Code Section 44-14-361.4 shall be filed. Each such notice and
affidavit shall be indexed under the name of the owner as contained in the
preliminary notice. The clerk shall collect a filing fee of $5.00 for the filing of such
preliminary notice.
(d) A person having a lien under paragraphs (1) through (8) of subsection (a) of
Code Section 44-14-361 may enforce the lien without filing a preliminary notice
of lien.
Id. § 44-14-361.3. Furthermore, O.G.CA. § 44-14-361.1 (Supp. 1994) provides in part: "(a)
To make good the liens specified in paragraphs (1) through (8) of subsection (a) of Code
Section 44-14-361, they must be created and declared in accordance with the following
provisions, and on failure of any of them the lien shall not be effective or enforceable...."
Id. § 44-14-361.1(a).
215. 209 Ga. App. at 192-93, 433 S.E.2d at 116.
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VI.

A.

SURETY, BOND, AND GUARANTOR ISSUES

Public Works Bonds

The area of public works bonds saw the most interesting developments
during the past year. In a series of cases stemming from certain
construction projects in DeKalb County in which the surety was
insolvent, the court of appeals held as an initial approach that the
county should have known of the potential insolvency due to irregular
affidavits submitted to it concerning the financial condition of the
surety.21 This approach was later rejected by the supreme court in a
decision that narrowed the obligation of a public body to inquire into the
financial well being of a surety offered to it on a public project.217

The Court of Appeals Finds DeKalb County Responsible. The
initial premise from which this series of cases originated is J & A
Pipeline Co. v. DeKalb County,21 in which it was held that a county
may be liable on a payment bond if the surety is insolvent, if the county
fails to inquire adequately into the solvency and sufficiency of the surety,

and the circumstances surrounding the transaction make this failure to
engage in further inquiry unreasonable.219 This principle was followed
in the first half of this survey period.
In Atlanta Mechanical, Inc. v. DeKalb County,' 0 Atlanta Mechanical
brought suit against DeKalb County on a public works project. 21
DeKalb County had entered into a public works contract with CRJ
Corporation to construct a records facility.'
CRJ Corporation tendered a payment bond to the county showing Contractors Surety &
Fidelity Company ("CSFC") as surety, but because CSFC was not
authorized at the time to do business in Georgia, it was required to file
a bond with an affidavit stating that the surety was the fee simple

216. J & A Pipeline Co. v. DeKalb County, 208 Ga. App. 123, 126, 430 S.E.2d 13, 17
rev'd in part, DeKalb County v. J & A Pipeline Co., 263 Ga. 645, 437 S.E.2d 327 (1993);
Atlanta Mechanical, Inc. v. DeKalb County, 209 Ga. App. 307, 309, 434 S.E.2d 494, 496
(1993).
217. DeKalb County v. J & A Pipeline Co., 263 Ga. 645, 646-47, 437 S.E.2d 327, 330
(1993).
218. 208 Ga. App. at 123, 430 S.E.2d at 13.
219. Id. at 125, 430 S.E.2d at 16.
220. 209 Ga. App. 307, 434 S.E.2d 494 (1993).
221. Id. at 307, 434 S.E.2d at 494.

222. Id., 434 S.E.2d at 495.
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owner of real estate equal in value to the amount of the bond.' The
county admitted that it did not investigate the solvency or sufficiency of
the surety prior to accepting the bond, and subsequent investigation
revealed that the affidavit was false in that the surety did not own any
of the scheduled real estate.22
Atlanta Mechanical contended that the county knew in mid-July 1990,
two weeks before accepting the bond, that the surety was the subject of
an ongoing investigation by the Georgia Insurance Commissioner.'
Indeed, the county had forwarded to the commissioner at that time
copies of payment and performance bonds which it had previously
accepted from the surety on other projects.'
The Insurance Commissioner ratified a cease and desist order against the surety on October 23,
1990, prohibiting the surety from continuing to act as an insurance
agent in Georgia."
The trial court granted the county's motion for
summary judgment, and this appeal followed.'
The court of appeals followed J & A Pipeline Co. 9 In holding that
the county had a duty to require a payment bond, the court of appeals
found the county liable for breach of that statutory duty, resulting in a

223. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 36-82-102 (1993) provides:
The bonds or security deposits required under Code Section 36-82-101 shall be
approved and filed with the treasurer or the person performing the duties usually
performed by a treasurer of the obligee named therein unless the contract is for
the erection, improvement, or repair of buildings for a state institution, in which
case it shall be approved and filed with the board or officer having the financial
management of such institution. If the surety named in the bonds is other than
a surety company authorized by law to do business in this state, such bonds shall
not be approved and filed unless such surety makes and files an affidavit with
such bonds, stating under oath that he is the fee simple owner of real estate equal
in value to the amount of the bonds over and above any and all liens, encumbrances, and exemption rights allowed by law. If the payment bond or security deposit
required in paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of Code Section 13-10-1, together with
affidavit when necessary, is not taken in the manner and form required in this
Code section, the corporation or body for which work is done under the contract
shall be liable to all subcontractors and to all persons furnishing the labor, skill,
tools, machinery, or materials to the contractor or subcontractor thereunder for
any loss resulting to them from such failure. No agreement, modification, or
change in the contract, change in the work covered by the contract, or extension
of time for the completion of the contract shall release the sureties of such
payment bond.
Id. § 36-2-102.
224. 209 Ga. App. at 308, 434 S.E.2d at 495.
225. Id.
226. I&
227. I&
228. Id. at 307, 434 S.E.2d at 494-495.
229. See supra note 216.
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direct right of action to the subcontractor or supplier." The court of
appeals held that the county had notice of the possible inadequacy of the
surety due to irregularities in the affidavit in the description of real
estate."m The court of appeals rejected the county's argument that an
amendment to the bond statute requiring an investigation of the
solvency of the surety indicates that no duty existed on the part of the
county prior to that amendment." The court of appeals concluded

230. 209 Ga. App. at 309, 434 S.E.2d at 496. See Brian J. Morrissey & Matthew W.
Wallace, ConstructionLaw, 44 MERCER L. REV. 125, 157-58 (1992).
231. 209 Ga. App. at 309, 434 S.E.2d at 496.
232. Id. at 310,434 S.E.2d at 496-97; O.C.GA. § 13-10-1 (Supp. 1994), provided in part
the basis for establishing liability on the part of the county, provided prior to amendment
as follows:
(a)(1) If the state, a county, a municipal corporation, or any public board or body
thereof requires a bid bond for any particular public work, no bid for a contract
with the state, county, municipal corporation, or any public board or body thereof
for the doing of such public work shall be valid for any purpose, unless the
contractor shall give a bid bond with good and sufficient surety or sureties
approved by the governing authority for the faithful acceptance of the contract
payable to, in favor of, and for the protection of the state, county, municipal
corporation, or public board or body thereof for which the contract is to be
awarded. The bid bond shall be in the amount of not less than 5 percent of the
total amount payable by the terms of the contract. No bid shall be read aloud or
considered if a proper bid bond or other security authorized in paragraph (2) of
this subsection has not been submitted. The provisions of this subsection shall not
apply to any bid for a contract which is required by law to be accompanied by a
proposal guaranty and shall not apply to bids for contracts with any public agency
or body which receives funding from the United States Department of Transportation and which is primarily engaged in the business of public transportation.
(2) In lieu of the bid bond provided for in paragraph (1) of this subsection, the
state, a county, a municipal corporation, or any public board or body may accept
a cashier's check, certified check, or cash in the amount of not less than 5 percent
of the total amount payable by the terms of the contract payable to and for the
protection of the state, county, municipal corporation, or public board or body
thereof for which the contract is to be awarded.
(b) No contract with this state, a county, a municipal corporation, or any public
board or body thereof, for the doing of any public work shall be valid for any
purpose, unless the contractor shall give:
(1) a performance bond with good and sufficient surety or sureties payable to, in
favor of, and for the protection of the state, county, municipal corporation, or
public board of body thereof for which the work is to be done. The performance
bond shall be in the amount of at least the total amount payable by the terms of
the contract. This bond shall not be required when a bond is required under Code
Section 36-10-4;
(2)(A) A payment bond with good and sufficient surety or sureties, payable to the
state, county, municipal corporation, or public board or body thereof for which the
work is to be done, and for the use and protection of all subcontractors and all
persons supplying labor, materials, machinery, and equipment in the prosecution
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that the amendment merely clarified the implicit understanding that a
surety was not good and sufficient unless it was solvent."8 The court
of appeals again upheld this principle in Mayer Electric Supply Co. v.
DeKalb County.234
The Supreme Court Reverses. In the meantime, the case starting
this controversy surrounding a county's duty to inquire into the solvency
of a proffered surety found its way to the supreme court. In DeKalb
County v. J & A Pipeline Co.," the supreme court reversed the court
of appeals' principle of a county's duty to inquire.'
The supreme
court differed in its interpretation of the statutory basis on which the
court of appeals had relied, holding that the controlling statute merely
provided that the contract with a county for doing public work would not
be valid unless the contractor provided good and sufficient surety. 7
of the work provided for in the contract. The payment bond shall be in the
amount of at least the total amount payable by the terms of the contract.
(B) In lieu of the payment bond provided for in subparagraph (A) of this
paragraph, the state, county, a municipal corporation, or any public board or body
may accept a cashier's check, certified check, or cash in the amount of at least the
total amount payable by the terms of the contract for the use and protection of all
subcontractors and all persons supplying labor, materials, machinery, and
equipment in the prosecution of work provided in the contract.
(c) This Code section shall not apply where the total contract price does not
exceed $40,000; provided, however, that the state, any department or agency
thereof, a county, a municipal corporation, or any public board or body thereof
may in its discretion require performance and payment bonds or bid bonds or
other security for any public works contract.
(d) Where the amount of any bond required under the other subsections of this
Code section does not exceed $300,000.00, the state, a county, a municipality, or
any public board or body may, in its sole discretion, accept an irrevocable letter
of credit issued by a bank or savings and loan association, as defined in Code
Section 7-1-4, in the amount of and in lieu of the bond otherwise required under
the other subsections of this Code section.
Id. § 13-10-1 (Supp. 1994). Subsection (f) was added to the statute as follows:
(f) Any bid bond, performance bond, or payment bond required by this Code
section shall be approved as to form and as to the solvency of the surety by the
officer of the state, county, municipal corporation, or public board or body who
negotiates the contract on behalf of the public entity. Said approval shall be
obtained prior to the bid's being accepted.
Id. § 13-10-1(f) (Supp. 1994).
233. 209 Ga. App. at 310, 434 S.E.2d at 497.
234. 210 Ga. App. 24, 24-25, 435 S.E.2d 220, 221 (1993).
235. 263 Ga. 645, 437 S.E.2d 327 (1993).
236. Id. at 650, 437 S.E.2d at 332.
237. Id. at 647, 437 S.E.2d at 330. "No contract with.., a county... for the doing of
any public work shall be valid for any purpose, unless the contractor shall give ... a
payment bond with good and sufficient surety ... " O.C.G.A. § 13-10-1(bX2)(A) (Supp.
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Likewise, the statute giving rise to a direct claim against a county made
itself contingent upon compliance with the initial statute.'
However,
the statute giving rise to the direct action merely provides that if the
payment bond, taken together with the affidavit if necessary, was not
taken in the manner and form required in the code, then liability could
attach. 9 The supreme court concluded that, when read together,
these statutes do not impose a duty on the county to require a payment
bond and provide for liability if the county breaches that duty.24 The
statute merely creates a duty on the part of the general contractor to
give a bond with good and sufficient surety, the breach of which duty
rendered the general contract invalid. 2" The county itself merely had
the duty to take the affidavit and bond in the specified manner and
form. m
Since the bond requirement is in lieu of a right to file a materialmen's
lien on a public works project, there is a common purpose for both the
bond and the lien law, and the bond requirements were to be construed
in para materia with the lien law to determine the extent of the county's
duty and liability therefrom.243 From this analysis the supreme court
determined that a county has discharged its obligation under the law if
it is presented with a payment bond or surety's affidavit which, on their
face, comport with the statutory requirements without any requirement
to make further inquiry or investigation.2' The bond or affidavit is
taken "in the manner" required when either is presented to, approved
by, and filed with the appropriate county official. 245 The payment bond

1994).
238. 263 Ga. at 646-47, 435 S.E.2d at 330. O.C.G.A. § 36-82-101 (1993) provides in
part: "No contract... with a county ... for the doing of any public work shall be valid for
any purpose unless the contractor shall comply with Code Section 13-10-1." Id. § 36-82101.
239. 263 Ga. at 646-47, 437 S.E.2d at 330. See O.C.GA. § 36-82-102 (1992) which
provides in pertinent part:
If the payment bond ... required in paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of Code
Section 13-10-1, together with [the surety's] affidavit when necessary, is not taken
in the manner and form required in this Code section, the [county] ... for which
work is done under the contract shall be liable to all subcontractors and to all
persons furnishing labor, skill, tools, machinery, or materials to the contractor or
subcontractor thereunder for any loss resulting to them from such failure ....
Id. § 36-82-102.
240. 263 Ga. at 647, 437 S.E.2d at 330.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 648, 437 S.E.2d at 331.
244. Id. at 649, 437 S.E.2d at 331.
245. Id.
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is taken "in the- form" required when, on its face, it purports to be
submitted on behalf of the general contractor who is obligated to make
such submission by law.'" Furthermore, the affidavit is taken in the
form required when it purports, on its face, to be a statement under oath
that the surety is the fee simple owner of certain real estate equal in
value to the amount of the bond.2' 7 Therefore, if the county takes a
payment bond from the general contractor or an affidavit from the
surety which does, on its face, comport with the statutory requirements,
the subcontractors and materialmen's direct action remedy will be
defeated notwithstanding the subsequent inefficacy of the bond or the
subsequent discovery of the falsity of the affidavit.'
B. Sureties
Claim Against Surety as Transitory Action. In HarryS. Peterson
Co. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.,"4 subcontractor, Harry S.
Peterson Company, sued National Union Fire Insurance Company on a
surety bond.'O The bond had been issued on behalf of Harvey Construction Company in connection with a Virginia construction contract.
The bond itself was signed in Maryland and the subcontract was entered
in Michigan. Peterson Company, a Michigan corporation, signed the
subcontract in Maryland. No documents were signed or work performed
in Georgia." The payment bond provided the following:
[n]o claim or action shall be commenced hereunder by any claimant...
[olther than in a state court of competent jurisdiction in and for the
country [sic] or other political subdivision of the state in which the
Project, or any part thereof, is situated, or in the United States District
Court for the district in which the project, or any part thereof, is
situated and not elsewhere. 2

246. Id.
247. Id., 437 S.E.2d at 331-32.
248. Id. at 649-50, 437 S.E.2d at 332. The court was also persuaded by the amendment
to O.C.GA. § 13-10-1(f) that a duty to investigate solvency did not exist prior to the date
of the amendment. 263 Ga. at 650, 437 S.E.2d at 332. The court made no indication as
to the effect of its ruling on the amendment, since the question was not before it. Id. at
651, 437 S.E.2d at 332.
249. 209 Ga. App. 585, 434 S.E.2d 778 (1993).
250. Id. at 585, 434 S.E.2d at 779.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 585-86, 434 S.E.2d at 779.
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National Union moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and improper venue.=
National Union did substantial business in Georgia but was not a
"resident" of Georgia for jurisdictional purposes.2 " The trial court
dismissed the case, and Peterson Company appealed.'
The court of
appeals found that the subcontractor's claim was a transitory action for
jurisdictional and venue purposes.' A transitory action:
comprehends in general those actions which at common law might be
tried wherever personal service could be obtained upon the defendant.
But if the cause of action is one that in its nature can arise in one
place only, the action is local and suit can be brought only where the
cause of action arose. In other words, an action is transitory where the
transaction on which it is founded might have taken place anywhere;
and it is local where the transaction is necessarily local, that is, could
have happened only in a particular place.'
The court of appeals concluded that the subcontractor's claim against the
surety was transitory and not local. 2" Notwithstanding this conclusion, the court of appeals upheld the venue selection provisions of the
contract, overruling Georgia case law to the contrary "
Release of Principal. In HardawayCo. v. Amwest Surety Insurance
Co.,2" the court addressed a question certified from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.2" The certified question
was as follows:
Whether a creditor's agreement to release a principal debtor, which
contains an express reservation of rights against the surety, is a

release of the surety's liability to the creditor on the surety bond or a
mere covenant by the creditor not to sue the principal debtor when the

253. Id. at 585, 434 S.E.2d at 779.
254. Id. at 586, 434 S.E.2d at 779.
255. Id. at 585, 434 S.E.2d at 779.

256. Id. at 587, 434 S.E.2d at 780.
257. Id. (quoting 77 AM. JUR. 2D, Venue § 2 (1975)).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 590, 434 S.E.2d at 782. The court stated, -Therefore, I believe the language
in Cartridge referring to 'broad considerations of public policy against limiting venue by
contract' should be disapproved." Id. See Cartridge Rental Network v. Video Entertainment, Inc., 132 Ga. App. 748, 209 S.E.2d 132 (1974).
260. 263 Ga. 698, 436 S.E.2d 642 (1993).
261. Id. at 698, 436 S.E.2d at 643. See Hardaway Co. v. Amwest Sur. Ins. Co., 986
F.2d 1395 (11th Cir. 1993).
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surety has not consented to the creditor's release of the principal
debtor.2 2
Hardaway was the prime contractor on a project for the Georgia

Department of Transportation, and it subcontracted with B & F
Contractors for performance of certain grading work.' s Amwest
Surety Insurance Co. guaranteed B & F's performance. When B & F
continued to experience financial difficulty on the job, Hardaway
demanded that Amwest fulfill the subcontract, which Amwest did.2"
B & F then sued Hardaway for payment of additional costs. 2' In a
settlement of that suit, Hardaway agreed to release B & F for claims
regarding default under the subcontract, but specifically reserved its
warranty claims against B & F and specifically provided that it retained
its rights against Amwest. B & F released all its claims against
Hardaway.2" Hardaway sued Ainwest for damages for B & F's
default.267 Amwest contended that the release terminated Hardaway's
rights against Amwest as a surety.26" The United States District
Court for the Southern District of Georgia granted summary judgment
to Amwest on this theory. 9 Upon review, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit declined to rule and requested that the
Georgia Supreme Court answer the certified question.270
"[The release of a principal debtor, without the consent of the surety,
releases the surety, unless the right to go against the surety is reserved
in the instrument of release, or it appears from the whole transaction
that the surety should remain bound." 7 Some Georgia case law,
however, had misinterpreted the general rule and had made holding the
surety obligated contingent on the existence not only of a reservation of
rights against the surety, but also on knowledge and consent of the
27
The supreme
surety that discharge of the principal is taking placeY.
court corrected this aberration in Georgia law holding that "either the

262.

263 Ga. at 698, 436 S.E.2d at 643-44.

263. Id., 436 S.E.2d at 643.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 698-99, 436 S.E.2d at 643; 986 F.2d 1395, 1396 (11th Cir. 1993).
271. 263 Ga. at 698, 436 S.E.2d at 644. See Schwitzerlet-Seigler Co. v. Citizens & S.
Bank, 155 Ga. 740, 118 S.E. 365 (1923).
272. 263 Ga. at 698, 436 S.E.2d at 644. See Hendricks v. Davis, 196 Ga. App. 286, 395
S.E.2d 632 (1990), overruled by Hardaway Co. v. Amwest Sur. Ins. Co., 263 Ga. 698, 436
S.E.2d 642 (1993).
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consent of the surety or the reservation of rights by the creditor will
suffice to insure the survival of the surety's obligation after the release
of the principal debtor." 3 Thus, the mere absence of the surety's
consent to the release would not release the surety, so long as the
creditor had reserved
in the instrument of release the right to proceed
27 4
against the surety.

Arbitration. In Abe Engineering, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity
Travelers Indemnity Company issued .payment and performance bonds on a school construction project on behalf of Williams
Construction Company, the general contractor.
Williams Construction contracted with Abe Engineering to perform certain work on the
project.277 A dispute arose between Abe Engineering and Williams
Construction which was submitted to arbitration. 28 Travelers Indemnity was aware of, but did not participate in, the arbitration proceedings.2
After the arbitrators issued an award for Abe Engineering,
Abe Engineering filed a pro se application in the Muscogee County
Superior Court to modify the order to include Travelers Indemnity as
surety and to enter judgment against both parties.28 0 Service was
attempted on Travelers Indemnity by mailing a copy of the motion by
certified mail to Continental Guaranty & Credit Corporation, an
adjusting company which handles various claims for Travelers Indemnity."' Travelers Indemnity moved to dismiss alleging insufficient
2
service of process. The trial court dismissed the suit on that basis.1
Applications under the Georgia Arbitration Code are to be made by
motion in the same manner as a complaint in a civil action is filed."3
Co.,275

273.

263 Ga. at 698, 436 S.E.2d at 644.

274.

Id.

275. 210 Ga. App. 551, 436 S.E.2d 754 (1993).
276. Id., 436 S.E.2d at 755.

277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. See Brian J. Morrissey & R. Kyle Woods, ConstructionLaw, 42 MERCER L.
Ruv. 25, 60-61 (1990).
281. 210 Ga. App. at 551, 436 S.E.2d at 755.
282. Id.
283. Id. O.C.G.A. § 9-9-4(a)(2) (Supp. 1994) provides: "All applications shall be by
motion and shall be heard in the manner provided by law and rule of court for the making
or hearing of motions, provided that the motion shall be filed in the same manner as a
complaint in a civil action." Id. § 9-9-4(a)(2). Furthermore, O.C.G.A. § 9-9-4(c)(2) (Supp.
1994) provides that: "[Tihe initial application to the court shall be served on the other
parties in the same manner as a complaint under Chapter 11 of this title." Id. § 9-9-4(c)(2).
Furthermore, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(dXl) (1993) provides that in certain circumstances service
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The court of appeals concluded that Abe was required to serve its motion
to modify the arbitration award in accordance with the Georgia Civil
Practice Act,' and that Act did not permit service on a defendant
corporation directly by certified or registered mail.'
VII.

MISCELLANEOUS

A.

Taxation
Tangential to strict construction law are tax laws that apply in certain
circumstances to construction companies or projects. In C.W. Matthews
Contracting Co. u. Collins,"' C.W. Matthews Contracting Co., a
construction paving contractor, brought suit against the Georgia
Department of Revenue for local sales taxes paid from November 1988
2
through November 1991 in the approximate amount of $ 3 5 0 ,0 0 0. s7
The taxes in question were local sales taxes produced by local option,
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit.Authority, and special county sales
taxes.'
The trial court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the exemption from local taxes for state
contractors set forth in Georgia law" 9 did not apply to local sales and
use taxes."
The court of appeals appeared genuinely interested in the question,
but found that it was without jurisdiction due to a procedural error in

on a nonresident corporation may be made by certified mail through the office of the
Secretary of State. Id. § 9-11-4(d)(1).
284. O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-1 to -132 (1993).
285. 210 Ga. App. at 551, 436 S.E.2d at 755. See KMM Indus., Inc. v. Professional
Ass'n, 164 Ga. App 475, 297 S.E.2d 512 (1982).
286. 210 Ga. App. 1, 435 S.E.2d 221 (1993).
287. Id. at 1, 435 S.E.2d at 222.
288. Id., 435 S.E.2d at 221-22.
289. See O.C.G.A. § 50-17-29(e) (1994) which provides:
No city, county, municipality, or other political subdivision of this state shall
impose any tax, assessment, levy, license fee, or other fee upon any contractors or
subcontractors as a condition to or result of the performance of a contract, work,
or services by such contractors or subcontractors in connection with any project
being constructed, repaired, remodeled, enlarged, serviced, or destroyed for, or on
behalf of, the state or any of its agencies, boards, bureaus, commissions, and
authorities; nor shall any city, county, municipality, or other political subdivision
of this state include the contract price of or value of such contract, work, or
services performed on such projects in computing the amount of any tax,
assessment, levy, license fee, or other fee authorized to be imposed on any
contractors or subcontractors.
Id § 50-17-29(e).
290. 210 Ga. App. at 1, 435 S.E.2d at 222.
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the filing of the appeal."' Thus, it remains an open question whether
local sales taxes are properly collected from contractors on projects with
the state. From the language of the opinion, it would appear that the
court of appeals would lend a sympathetic ear to such a claim if properly
brought before it.
VIII. CONCLUSION
So far, the Georgia appellate courts have resisted great changes to
theories of liability, novel or otherwise, that may have been adopted in
other jurisdictions. Even so, the pressure to change will remain for an
industry in a state of flux as the sources of revenue for projects in good
times and bad times become targets for those whose efforts and contracts
do not turn out as planned.

291. Id. at 1-2, 435 S.E.2d at 222.

